Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude: Why the Void-for-Vagueness Argument Is Still Available and Meritorious by Moore, Derrick
Cornell International Law Journal
Volume 41
Issue 3 Fall 2008 Article 6
Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude: Why the Void-
for-Vagueness Argument Is Still Available and
Meritorious
Derrick Moore
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell International Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Moore, Derrick (2008) "Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude: Why the Void-for-Vagueness Argument Is Still Available and
Meritorious," Cornell International Law Journal: Vol. 41: Iss. 3, Article 6.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol41/iss3/6
"Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude'.
Why the Void-For-Vagueness Argument
is Still Available and Meritorious
Derrick Moore'
Introduction ..................................................... 814
I. Background .............................................. 816
A. "Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude" ................... 816
1. What is "Moral Turpitude?" ........................ 816
2. Immigration Law Statutory History ................. 820
3. Crimes Found to "Involve Moral Turpitude"......... 823
B. Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine .......................... 826
II. Jordan v. De George: The Supreme Court Tiptoes Around
the Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine .......................... 828
A. Supreme Court's Majority Opinion .................... 829
B. Justice Jackson's Dissent .............................. 831
C. Interpretation of Jordan ................................ 832
III. Jordan Does Not Block a Vagueness Attack ............... 834
A. Prelim inary Issues .................................... 834
B. Concerns with the Jordan Decision .................... 835
1. Narrow Holding Binding Only "Easy" Fraud Cases ... 835
2. Void-for-Vagueness Argument Raised Sua Sponte ...... 836
3. Flaws of the Majority Opinion ...................... 837
IV. "Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude" is Unconstitutionally
V agu e .................................................... 8 3 9
C onclu sion ...................................................... 842
Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the
law before he [commits a crime], it is reasonable that a fair warning should
be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of
what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. 1
"[T]he legislature ... should express its will in language that need not
deceive the common mind. Every man should be able to know with cer-
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tainty when he is committing a crime."2
"[T]he loose terminology of moral turpitude hampers uniformity .... It is
hardly to be expected that words which baffle judges will be more easily
interpreted by laymen ...."3
Introduction
The consequences for aliens committing criminal acts can be
extremely serious. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 4 and
U.S. courts may exclude-refuse entry into the United States-or deport-
remove from the United States-aliens for certain crimes.5 Because the
possible punishment of deportation or exclusion is so severe, 6 one would
expect Congress to detail the exact crimes for which an alien could be
deported or excluded. Unfortunately, Congress has done nothing to artic-
ulate a workable standard for such crimes. Instead, the determination of
whether aliens should be deported or excluded is dependent upon whether
an alien commits a "crime involving moral turpitude."
7
The phrase "crimes involving moral turpitude" has been described as
"vague,"8 "nebulous,"9 "most unfortunate," 10 and even "bewildering.""
Since its inception into immigration law over one hundred years ago, 12 the
term has had a harrowing and disruptive existence. 13 Legislators have
sought to have the law amended' 4 and have even suggested eliminating the
2. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 220 (1875).
3. Note, Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude, 43 HARV. L. REV. 117, 121 (1930).
4. Effective March 1, 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was
abolished and became part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). See Blake v.
Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 91 n.1 (2d Cir. 2007). A vast majority of the comments and
court opinions on immigration involve the INS, but this Note will refer to the current
agency as the DHS.
5. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2006) (excluding); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2006)
(deporting).
6. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has discussed the severity of deportation:
"[Dieportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment of exile.
It is the forfeiture for misconduct of a residence in this country. Such a forfeiture is a
penalty.. . . [Tihe stakes are considerable for the individual . Fong Haw Tan v.
Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (internal citations omitted).
7. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(1) (2006); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H) (2006). See
discussion infra Part I.A.2 for a more detailed discussion of the statutes.
8. See, e.g., Zoe Lofgren, A Decade of Radical Change in Immigration Law: An Inside
Perspective, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 349, 357 (2005).
9. See, e.g., Lea McDermid, Comment, Deportation is Different: Noncitizens and
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 89 CAL. L. Rev. 741, 775 (2001).
10. Note, supra note 3, at 121.
11. See, e.g., Masha Heifetz, Mens Rea, Gravity of Harm, and the Classification of
Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude, 12 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 1283, 1283 (2007).
12. HOUSE COMM. ON THEJUDICIARY, 100TH CONG., 2D SESS., GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION
OF ALIENS UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND
ANALYSIS 10 (Comm. Print 1988) [hereinafter GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION] (stating that
moral turpitude first appeared in U.S. immigrations laws in 1891).
13. See discussion infra Part I.A.
14. See 142 CONG. REC. S4058-02 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1996) (statement of Sen. Dole)
(proposing an amendment to "remedy" the "vague language like crimes [involving]
moral turpitude").
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term "moral turpitude" altogether. 15 United States Courts of Appeal are
split over what constitutes moral turpitude. 16 Scholars have also expressed
their dismay over the statute and have made recommendations to Congress
for a more accurate definition of the term.17 Nevertheless, Congress has
not amended the statute, defined the phrase, or articulated a list of crimes
that meet this standard. 18 Considering the vague nature of the phrase, and
the reluctance of Congress to define it with greater specificity, this phrase
looks to be a prime candidate for examination by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Although the Court could find the phrase unconstitutional for failing
to have a "sufficiently definite meaning,"'19 the Supreme Court has
declined to do so thus far. In Jordan v. De George, the Supreme Court held
that "moral turpitude" is not void for vagueness. 20 After Jordan, most
courts have held that aliens are foreclosed from arguing that the phrase
"crimes involving moral turpitude" is unconstitutional. 2 1 Some scholars
have agreed. 22 Even scholars who agree that the phrase is vague have
refrained from arguing vagueness or other unconstitutional grounds.
2 3
Instead, they have used alternative means, such as recommending that
Congress redefine crimes involving moral turpitude 24 or that U.S. courts
specify what crimes qualify as "involving moral turpitude. '2 5 This Note
argues that Jordan does not foreclose a void-for-vagueness attack and that
the vagueness argument is still meritorious.
Part I of this Note explains the relevant background of crimes involv-
ing moral turpitude and how both the legislature and the courts have inter-
preted this phrase. Part I also examines the void-for-vagueness doctrine
and explains how the Supreme Court determines that a statute is void for
15. Note, supra note 3, at 121 n.43 (citing H.R. REP. No. 69-3, at 3 (1926) (stating
that the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization was "determined to delete
the phrase from the act")).
16. Compare Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzalez, 503 F.3d 1063, 1073 (9th Cir. 2007) (hold-
ing that "accessory after the fact" does not constitute moral turpitude), with Itani v.
Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 2002), and Cabral v. INS, 15 F.3d 193, 197
(1st Cir. 1994) (holding that alien convicted of being an accessory after the fact to mur-
der committed a crime of moral turpitude).
17. See, e.g., Brian C. Harms, Redefining "Crimes of Moral Turpitude": A Proposal to
Congress, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 259, 283 (2001).
18. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2006); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2006).
19. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
20. See id. at 232.
21. See Marciano v. INS, 450 F.2d 1022, 1024 (8th Cir. 1971); see also Ramirez v.
INS, 413 F.2d 405, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Tseung Chu v. Cornell, 247 F.2d 929, 938-39
(9th Cir. 1957). But see Corp. of Haverford Coll. v. Reeher, 329 F. Supp. 1196, 1205
(E.D. Pa. 1971) (stating thatJordan was limited to crimes involving fraud and does not
preclude a future void-for-vagueness attack).
22. See, e.g., Nate Carter, Comment, Shocking the Conscience of Mankind: Using Inter-
national Law to Define "Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude" in Immigration Law, 10 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REv. 955, 962 (2006) ("legally the [void-for-vagueness] argument is closed").
23. See, e.g., Harms, supra note 17, at 260.
24. See id. ("[A]lthough the Supreme Court has held that the definition of 'crimes
involving moral turpitude' was not unconstitutionally vague, the definition is vague
enough to warrant a redefinition by Congress.").
25. See Carter, supra note 22, at 965-72; Heifetz, supra note 11, at 1293-94.
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vagueness. Part II discusses Jordan v. De George and various interpreta-
tions of the Court's decision. Part III argues that the Jordan decision has
not foreclosed a void-for-vagueness attack on the immigration statutes and
discusses three problems with the case: (1) the narrow holding is only
binding on fraud cases, (2) the void-for-vagueness argument was raised sua
sponte by the Court, and (3) other flaws in the majority opinion. Part IV
argues that moral turpitude is an unconstitutionally vague standard
predominantly by examining recent decisions in the immigration context.
The Note concludes that the United States Supreme Court should grant
certiorari on a recent circuit case and explore the vagueness argument.
I. Background
A. "Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude"
The phrase "crimes involving moral turpitude" is unclear and vague.
Although courts and immigration officers since 1891 have utilized this
phrase to deport and exclude tens of thousands of aliens, 26 the definition
has been highly criticized for its vagueness and ambiguity.2 7 To thor-
oughly understand the background of this controversial term, one should
consider the attempts to find a suitable definition for the phrase, the statu-
tory history, and specific crimes found to involve or not involve moral
turpitude.
1. What is "Moral Turpitude?"
Congress has never defined what amounts to a "crime involving moral
turpitude." 28 The legislative history of the statutes indicate that Congress
left interpretation of the term to U.S. courts and administrative agencies.
29
Yet these entities have been unable to craft a clear definition. 30 To help
interpret statutory language, courts typically start with congressional gui-
dance.3 1 Because this guidance appears to be absent from the statutory or
legislative history,3 2 the most useful place to start may be the dictionary-
the "last resort of the baffled judge. '33 Obtaining a definition of "crime
involving moral turpitude" either through precedent, deference to the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), or the dictionary is usually the first
step in the discussion sections of court opinions and articles by
26. See Harms, supra note 17, at 259. In fact, it is the most-used exclusionary
ground by DHS officers. Id. at 260 (stating that moral turpitude is "the criminal exclu-
sion ground that the INS uses more than any other").
27. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 22.
28. Id. at 957; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2006); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2006).
29. See Cabral v. INS, 15 F.3d 193, 195 (1st Cir. 1994).
30. See Harms, supra note 17, at 264.
31. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983) ("We must give
effect to this plain language unless there is good reason to believe Congress intended the
language to have some more restrictive meaning.").
32. The legislative history is arguably slightly helpful in that it shows crimes involv-
ing moral turpitude might lead only to violent crimes, but very few courts have ever even
discussed this. See infra notes 300-302 and accompanying text.
33. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 234 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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commentators.
3 4
The most common definition of moral turpitude is similar to one
found in early editions of Black's Law Dictionary:
[An] act of baseness, vileness, or the depravity in private and social duties
which man owes to his fellow man, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man ....
Act or behavior that gravely violates moral sentiment or accepted moral stan-
dards of community and is a morally culpable quality held to be present in
some criminal offenses as distinguished from others .... The quality of a
crime involving grave infringement of the moral sentiment of the community
as distinguished from statutory mala prohibita.
3 5
Although many commentators believe this definition to be the one
most commonly used, it is not the only definition. The Fifth Circuit in
Hamdan v. INS, 36 in an apparent paraphrasing of the Black's Law defini-
tion, defined moral turpitude as "conduct that shocks the public con-
science as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the
accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to soci-
ety in general."'3 7 The court clarified this statement, remarking further
that "[m]oral turpitude has been defined as an act which is per se morally
reprehensible and intrinsically wrong." 38 Previously, the Fifth Circuit had
defined the term as "[a]nything done contrary to justice, honesty, principle
or good morals."
39
Other United States Courts of Appeal have used similar definitions to
the one formulated by the Fifth Circuit. 40 Some courts defined crimes
involving moral turpitude as ones which "grievously [offend] the moral
code of mankind. '4 1 Other courts included the term "common law" in
their definition, defining the crimes as acts that were "at common law
34. See Heifetz, supra note 11, at 1284; see, e.g.,Jordan, 341 U.S. at 227-30; Hyder v.
Keisler, 506 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 2007); Itani v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213, 1215 (11th
Cir. 2002); United States v. Smith, 420 F.2d 428, 431 (5th Cir. 1970).
35. Harms, supra note 17, at 264 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1008-09 (6th
ed. 1990)); see also Smith, 420 F.2d at 431 (utilizing Black's Law Dictionary to define
moral turpitude).
36. 98 F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 1996).
37. See id. at 186.
38. Id.
39. Guarneri v. Kessler, 98 F.2d 580, 581 (5th Cir. 1938).
40. Recent cases have used both definitions. Compare Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d
88, 103 (2d Cir. 2007) (describing moral turpitude as "inherently base, vile, or
depraved" (quoting Gill v. INS, 420 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 2005))), with De Leon-Reynoso
v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 633, 636 (3d Cir. 2002) (describing moral turpitude as "contrary
to justice, honesty, or morality"). The former definition has been the definition adopted
by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). See, e.g., Hyder v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 388,
391 (5th Cir. 2007). The Attorney General has approved, and courts have adopted, a
combination of the two definitions as well. See Da Rosa Silva v. INS, 263 F. Supp. 2d
1005, 1011 (E.D. Pa. 2003); Matter of Serna, 20 I&N Dec. 579, 582 (BIA 1992).
41. See Harms, supra note 17, at 265 (quoting Annotation, What Constitutes "Crime
Involving Moral Turpitude" Within Meaning of §§ 212(a)(9) and 241(a)(4) of Immigration
and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1182(a)(9), 1251(a)(4)), and Similar Predecessor Stat-
utes Providing for Exclusion or Deportation of Aliens Convicted of Such Crime, 23 A.L.R.
FED. 480, 493 (2000) [hereinafter CIMT Annotation]); see also Coykendall v. Skrmetta,
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intrinsically or morally wrong."'42 The array of different judicial defini-
tions for this phrase demonstrates the problem courts have had in deter-
mining what crimes fall within the category of "crimes involving moral
turpitude. '4 3 It also corroborates why many scholars still consider the
phrase to be "undefined,"44 or at least not clearly defined.
4 5
Yet, there is some agreement on what constitutes a crime involving
moral turpitude. First, crimes involving moral turpitude are a subset of all
possible crimes; they are not simply unlawful acts. 4 6 Acts that are statuto-
rily prohibited, but are not immoral or inherently wrong, generally do not
involve moral turpitude. 4 7 Second, moral turpitude must be judged by
moral, rather than legal, standards. 48 Although neither of these statements
create clear guidance, they do represent the common ground shared among
the circuits and scholars regarding the definition of moral turpitude.
4 9
After developing an appropriate definition of the phrase, courts then
establish whether an alien's conviction can be classified as a "crime involv-
ing moral turpitude. °50 While each court applies its own precedent, a
majority of courts follow a two-pronged test.51 The court first determines
what law was actually violated and then decides whether all the conduct
punished by the law involves moral turpitude. 5 2 This test is known as the
"categorical approach."5 3
The facts of the offense are not the important inquiry; instead, the
issue is whether the "full range of conduct encompassed by the statute
constitutes a crime of moral turpitude. '5 4 In other words, the offense must
be "always and under all circumstances" a crime involving moral turpi-
tude. 5 5 Courts and the BIA 56 have argued that this rule is supported by the
22 F.2d 120, 120-21 (5th Cir. 1927); United States v. Carrollo, 30 F. Supp. 3, 6 (W.D.
Mo. 1939).
42. Tillinghast v. Edmead, 31 F.2d 81, 83 (1st Cir. 1929).
43. See Harms, supra note 17, at 265.
44. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 22, at 958.
45. See, e.g., CIMT Annotation, supra note 41, at 491.
46. See Harms, supra note 17, at 265 (stating that the commission of a crime involv-
ing moral turpitude involves "something more than a merely illegal or criminal act").
47. See Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013, 1018 (9th Cir. 2005).
48. The fact that moral turpitude does not involve legal standards may indicate why
the term has never been clearly defined. See CIMT Annotation, supra note 41, at 492.
49. See, e.g., Pamela M. Stahl, The Legal Assistance Attorney's Guide to Immigration
and Naturalization, 177 MIL. L. REv. 1, 10-11 (2003).
50. See Heifetz, supra note 11, at 1284.
51. See Harms, supra note 17, at 266. It is not obvious that all circuit courts follow a
specific test. For example, in Jaadan v. Gonzalez, 211 Fed. App'x 422 (6th Cir. 2006),
the court cites a Ninth Circuit decision in determining what approach to take to decide
whether a crime involves moral turpitude. 211 Fed. App'x at 426 (citing Cuevas-Gaspar,
430 F.3d at 1017). The majority of circuit courts appear to use a different test, but do
not systematically explain the test. See, e.g., Castle v. INS, 541 F.2d 1064 (4th Cir.
1976).
52. See Harms, supra note 17, at 266 (emphasis added).
53. See Cuevas-Gaspar, 430 F.3d at 1017.
54. Id.
55. Heifetz, supra note 11, at 1284.
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literal text of the immigration statutes and for other policy reasons. 57
Additionally, very few factors would actually give rise to a per se crime
involving moral turpitude.5 8 For example, the seriousness of the crime,
59
type of offense (e.g. felony or misdemeanor), sentencing term, and the
name given to the offense are not per se determinative for the second prong
of the test. 60 Therefore, the second prong of the test is especially
important.
The general rule of the categorical approach is if there is at least one
situation where the acts do not involve moral turpitude, then a crime
involving moral turpitude cannot rise out of violation of that law.6 1 How-
ever, there is one exception to this rule. If the statute is divisible-one part
of the statute always involves moral turpitude and another section of the
statute sometimes involves moral turpitude-then courts will apply what is
known as a "modified categorical approach. '6 2 In that situation, the court
will look at the record of conviction 6 3 to determine whether the offense
falls under the section of the statute that always involves moral turpitude.
64
Like the categorical approach, in the "modified categorical approach" the
court does not look at the underlying facts of the conviction.
65
Although most courts apply the "categorical approach" or the "modi-
fied categorical approach," 66 some justices and scholars have expressed
56. "The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) [was] the highest administrative tribu-
nal for immigration and nationality matters in the United States." Jessica R. Hertz, Com-
ment, Appellate Jurisdiction over the Board of Immigration Appeal's Affirmance Without
Opinion Procedure, 73 U. CMI. L. REV. 1019, 1019 (2006).
57. See Carter, supra note 22, at 965. See discussion infra Part III.A.3 and Carter,
supra note 22, at 965-68 for arguments that the public policy explanations are without
merit. The literal text argument appears to be of some merit, but it aids in the void-for-
vagueness argument. See discussion infra Part III.A.3.
58. See Harms, supra note 17, at 265-66.
59. See id. at 265. Heifetz goes one step further and argues that seriousness of the
harm is not even a "standard element" in determining whether a crime involves moral
turpitude. Heifetz, supra note 11, at 1285. But see Austin T. FragomenJr. & Steven C.
Bell, Removal of Illegal Aliens, in 35TH IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION INSTITUTE, at 289,
314 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B0-01GH, 2002)
(arguing that seriousness of the crime is a factor).
60. See CIMT Annotation, supra note 41, at 494-96; Harms, supra note 17, at
265 -66.
61. See Cerezo v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1163, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 2008).
62. See id. at 1169.
63. The record of conviction consists of a "narrow, specific set of documents,"
Tokatly v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 613, 620 (9th Cir. 2004), including "the indictment, the
judgment of conviction, jury instructions, a signed guilty plea, or the transcript from the
plea proceedings." Id. (quoting United States v. Rivera-Sanchez, 247 F.3d 905, 908 (9th
Cir. 2001) (en banc)).
64. See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 17, 20-21 (2005); Wala v. Mukasey,
511 F.3d 102, 107-08 (2d Cir. 2007) (applying the modified categorical test to exclu-
sion proceedings and stating that a tribunal may consider a charging document in a jury
trial, a verdict or judgment of a conviction, a record of a sentence, a transcript of a plea
colloquy, or a plea agreement under the modified categorical approach).
65. See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 17, 20-21; Wala, 511 F.3d at 107.
66. The First Circuit's opinion in Conteh v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 45, 55-57 (1st Cir.
2006), discusses a split in how courts apply the modified categorical approach. The
Ninth Circuit applies the more rigid and formal approach that was detailed in Taylor v.
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disapproval of these approaches. 6 7 For example, in his dissent in Marciano
v. INS, 68 District Judge G. Thomas Eisele69 noticed that the approach used
by most courts produced results that were "contrary to those intended by
the plain language of the deportation statute. '70 Judge Eisele proposed
that courts adopt the "three-classification" rule proposed by Judge Ander-
son in his dissent in Tillinghast v. Edmead71 .7 2 This alternative proposes
that crimes can be classified into three groups: (1) crimes inherently
involving moral turpitude, (2) crimes that do not involve moral turpitude,
and (3) crimes that may or may not involve moral turpitude, depending
upon the circumstances of the case. 73 According to Judge Eisele, if a crime
falls into the third category, the court should look to the actual circum-
stances and underlying facts of the case. 74 This alternative, however, has
never been adopted by the federal courts and the categorical approach
remains the general rule.
75
2. Immigration Law Statutory History
The first time the United States Legislature designed to exclude cer-
tain aliens was in the Act of March 3, 1875.76 This Act prohibited con-
United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), and Shepard. See Conteh, 461 F.3d at 52-57. The
First and Third Circuits apply a more liberal test. Id. at 55. However, the difference
between the two versions of the test is small and for background purposes, both match
the approach detailed in the text. See id. at 55-56 ("We emphasize that the difference
between this approach and that of the Ninth Circuit is only a matter of degree.").
67. See Carter, supra note 22, at 967-68.
68. 450 F.2d 1022 (8th Cir. 1971).
69. District Judge Eisele for the Eastern District of Arkansas was sitting by designa-
tion. Id. at 1022. Interestingly, Judge Eisele was appointed District Judge only the year
before the decision in Marciano. THE AMERICAN BENCH, JUDGES OF THE NATION 207
(Marie T. Finn et al. eds., 19th ed. 2009).
70. See Marchiano, 450 F.2d at 1027-28 (Eisele, J., dissenting).
71. 31 F.2d 81 (1st Cir. 1929). Technically, Anderson did not "propose" this rule;
instead, he agreed with the District Court Judge's opinion in Ex parte Edmead, 27 F.2d
438 (D. Mass. 1928), and quoted the lower court's majority opinion in agreement. See
Tillinghast, 31 F.2d at 84.
72. See Marchiano, 450 F.2d at 1028 (Eisele, J., dissenting):
Whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude under this test may
be a question of fact. Some crimes are of such character as necessarily to
involve this element; others ... do not; and still others might involve it or might
not. As to this last class, the circumstances must be regarded to determine
whether moral turpitude was shown.
Tillinghast, 31 F.2d at 84 (Anderson,J., dissenting) (quoting Ex parte Edmead, 27 F.2d at
439) (internal citation omitted).
73. See Marchiano, 450 F.2d at 1028 (Eisele, J., dissenting); Carter, supra note 22, at
967.
74. See Marchiano, 450 F.2d at 1028 (Eisele, J., dissenting).
75. Carter, supra note 22, at 967.
76. GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION, supra note 12, at 6. This Committee Print unfortu-
nately does not discuss the deportation statute at length; however, because the phrase
"crimes involving moral turpitude" has been interpreted or discussed within the depor-
tation and exclusion contexts interchangeably, this history is helpful for background
discussion purposes.
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victed criminals from entering the United States. 77 The Act was apparently
passed without any controversy, as there are no printed reports or records
of floor debate in either the House or the Senate, and President Grant
signed the bill within hours of its passing vote in the Senate.78 Since this
original legislation, additional amendments to the Act and further legisla-
tion have increased the number of exclusionary rules and have led to
stricter enforcement of the laws.
Five times between 1875 and 1917, Congress added more groups to
the excludable class of convicted criminals and increased the number of
excludable aliens under its immigration laws. 79 The Act of March 3, 1891
is the most important legislation, however, because in this Act, the term
"moral turpitude" first appeared in U.S. immigration laws.80 Between
1880 and 1890, twice the number of immigrants entered the United States
as compared to the previous decade.8 1 Additionally, in 1905 alone, over
one million people immigrated to the United States.
8 2
Further legislation in the form of a 1907 immigration statute excluded
"persons who have been convicted of or admit having committed a felony
or other crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. 8s 3 Stated more
generally, aliens could be excluded for committing a crime involving moral
turpitude. Interestingly enough, the term "moral turpitude" was added
without any discussion in the reports accompanying the legislation.8 4 As a
result, it is hard to discern why the term appears in the Act. If the goal was
to "clearly distinguish desirable from undesirable immigrants," including
the term "moral turpitude" was most likely not the best way to realize this
objective because the statute lacks a clear definition of the term.8 5
The Immigration Act of February 5, 1917 did not change the 1907 Act
with regards to the exclusion of aliens.8 6 The statute, however, did allow
77. See id. at 95. The first two exclusionary classes under the Act were aliens con-
victed of certain crimes and women imported for prostitution purposes. Id. at 6.
78. See id. at 7; Harms, supra note 17, at 261.
79. See GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION, supra note 12, at 7-15. Specifically, Congress
amended the statute in 1882, 1891, 1903, 1907, and 1910. Id. at 7-12.
80. See id. at 10.
81. See id. at 9 (noting that almost 5,250,000 immigrants entered the United States
between 1880 and 1890 as compared to 2,800,000 immigrants between 1870 and
1880). For the latter decade, that is an average of 1500 immigrants per day.
82. See id. at 14. This is an average of almost 2800 immigrants per day-almost
double that of a few years prior. During this time of increased immigration, President
Theodore Roosevelt gave multiple speeches to Congress that expressed the sentiment of
the nation regarding immigration. See id. On Dec. 7, 1903, he stated "[W]e cannot have
too much immigration of the right kind, and we should have none at all of the wrong
kind. The need is to devise some system by which undesirable immigrants shall be kept
out entirely .... Id. Two years later, he expressed a similar opinion: "The prime need is
to keep out all immigrants who will not make good American citizens. The laws now
existing . . .should be strengthened." Id. These statements demonstrate that in the
early twentieth century there was a "general concern for the number and desirability of
voluntary migration." See Harms, supra note 17, at 262.
83. GROUNDs FOR EXCLUSION, supra note 12, at 20.
84. Id. at 10.
85. See Harms, supra note 17, at 262-64.
86. GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION, supra note 12, at 20.
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for the deportation of persons convicted of a "crime involving moral turpi-
tude" due to public opinion condemning illegal activity of aliens. 8 7 During
hearings in the House Committee on Immigration, Representative Sabath
opined that the term "crime involving moral turpitude" had deficiencies
and was not clearly defined.8 8 Nonetheless, Congress made no attempt to
clarify the phrase.89
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 kept the basic provi-
sions of the 1917 Act, 90 but made two important changes. 9 1 First, the Act
of 1952 eliminated the references to the kind of crime that involves moral
turpitude, supporting the concept that exclusion should be based solely on
moral turpitude. 92 Second, the Act allowed for the exclusion of aliens who
"commit acts which constitute the essential elements" of a crime involving
moral turpitude.
9 3
Not surprisingly, there was some disagreement before Congress
passed the Act. For instance, President Truman vetoed it.9 4 Although the
Act ultimately became law through a supermajority vote of the Senate, Tru-
man made his opinion clear in his veto message by stating that some
"changes made by the bill ... would result in empowering minor immigra-
tion and consular officials to act as prosecutor, judge, and jury in deter-
mining whether acts constituting a crime have been committed." 9 5
The most recent version of the Immigration and Nationality Act allows
for exclusion and deportation of immigrants. 96 The law allows for exclu-
sion of aliens who have been convicted of, or admitted to being convicted
of, a crime involving moral turpitude, or who committed acts which
amount to the essential elements of such a crime. 9 7 Aliens can be deported
for a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude if (1) they committed
the crime within five years of being admitted to the United States, (2) the
sentence for the crime is for a year or longer,98 or (3) the crime committed
87. See Harms, supra note 17, at 262.
88. See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 233-34 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(discussing and quoting Hearing on H.R. 10384 Before H. Comm. on Immigration and
Naturalization, 64th Cong., 8 (1916)).
89. See id. at 234.
90. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163
(1952) (amended 2006).
91. See GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION, supra note 12, at 96.
92. See id.
93. See id. The purpose of this change was to allow INS officers to exclude aliens
who admit the essential facts of a crime that would normally involve moral turpitude,
but do not actually admit to committing the crime. Id.
94. See id. at 109.
95. See id.
96. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2006); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2006).
97. See Immigration and Naturalization Act § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(l), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1 182(a)(2)(A)(i)(l) (2006) (noting that certain aliens are ineligible for a visa if they are
convicted of, or "admit[ I committing acts which constitute the essential elements of...
a crime involving moral turpitude").
98. Congress amended this part of the statute in 1996. Before 1996, the imposed
sentence had to be more than one year to subject an immigrant to deportation. See
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000)); see also Attila Bogdan, Guilty Pleas by Non-Citizens
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is at least the second crime involving moral turpitude conviction. 99 An
essential difference between deportation and exclusion is that the DHS
may only deport an alien for a conviction of a crime involving moral turpi-
tude, whereas the DHS may exclude an alien without a conviction. 10 0
Although Congress has neither changed the phrase "crime involving
moral turpitude" nor given more lucidity to its definition, there have been
multiple criticisms of the present law from various Congressional actors.
In March 1981, the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy
submitted a report on the current immigration and refugee law. 10 1 Of the
sixteen Commissioners, thirteen agreed that Congress should reexamine
the grounds for deporting aliens from the United States. 10 2 On April 24,
1996, Senator Bob Dole addressed the Senate floor, stating that the term
"crimes involving moral turpitude" is "vague" and "lack[s] the certainty we
should desire."'01 3 Nevertheless, the term still appears as an essential part
of the deportation and exclusion statutes.
3. Crimes Found to "Involve Moral Turpitude"
There have been many disagreements among U.S. Courts of Appeal
and general indecision as to whether specific crimes involve moral turpi-
tude. 10 4 Some of these circuit splits have arisen very recently. For exam-
ple, in 2007, the Fifth Circuit held that a conviction for misusing a Social
Security number is a crime involving moral turpitude.10 5 This holding is a
direct contradiction of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Beltran-Tirado v.
INS. 10 6 The Fifth Circuit specifically acknowledged the Ninth Circuit's
decision, but then clearly asserted that the Fifth Circuit was going to
in Illinois: Immigration Consequences Reconsidered, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 19, 31 (2003)
("Following the amendments made by AEDPA in 1996, [the provision discussing length
of sentence] applies to aliens .. .as long as the offense in question carries a potential
sentence of one year or longer."). There have been multiple proposed amendments to
change this section back to the pre-1996 language. See 146 CONG. REC. S9388-05 (daily
ed. Sept. 27, 2000) (statement of Senator Leahy).
99. See Immigration and Naturalization Act § 237(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2007) ("Any alien who at any time after admission is convicted of
two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of
criminal misconduct, regardless of whether confined therefor and regardless of whether
the convictions were in a single trial, is deportable.").
100. See Harms, supra note 17, at 263.
101. See GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION, supra note 12, at 1.
102. See id. at 1-2.
103. 142 CONG. REC. S4058-02 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1996).
104. See, e.g., Hyder v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 388, 392-93 (5th Cir. 2007) (discussing a
split between the Fifth Circuit and Ninth Circuit over what constitutes moral turpitude).
At the federal level alone there are many crimes which may or may not involve moral
turpitude. See generally DAN KESSELBRENNER & SANDY LIN, SELECTED IMMIGRATION CONSE-
QUENCES OF CERTAIN FEDERAL OFFENSES (2003), http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/
1067629132.3/fedchart.pdf. In this chart, of the over 125 crimes listed, only 50 are
consistently considered to be crimes involving moral turpitude and 7 do not involve
moral turpitude. See generally id. The other approximately 70 critnes depend upon the
factual or legal situation. See generally id.
105. Hyder, 506 F.3d at 392.
106. 213 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2000).
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"decline to follow Beltran-Tirado."'10 7 The court explained that Beltran-
Tirado was not binding precedent, expanded a narrow exemption too far,
and was inconsistent with the Fifth Circuit's existing precedents.' 0 8
The Ninth Circuit added to the lack of clarity in 2007. In Navarro-
Lopez v. Gonzalez, 10 9 a majority of the court decided that accessory after
the fact was not a crime involving moral turpitude, 110 a conclusion that
conflicted with every other circuit court that had specifically addressed the
issue. 1 ' A majority of the justices found cases in the Eleventh and Seventh
Circuit courts to be unpersuasive and based on faulty reasoning.
1 12
Yet, there are some crimes that all circuit courts agree are deportable
or exclusionary offenses. Some scholars and courts divide these offenses
into different categories.11 3 Authorities agree that crimes involving an ele-
ment of fraud, larceny, or intent to harm persons or things are crimes
involving moral turpitude. 114 Some courts combine the last two elements,
intent to harm persons or things, into one generic category of "grave acts of
baseness or depravity." 115 The U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs
Manual divides crimes involving moral turpitude into three categories: (1)
crimes against property, (2) crimes against the government, and (3) crimes
committed against person, family relationship, and sexual morality.
116
Crimes involving acts of fraud, whether against individuals or the gov-
ernment, have historically been considered crimes of moral turpitude.
117
Also, attempting to commit, being an accessory in the commission of, aid-
ing and abetting in the commission of, and taking part in a conspiracy to
commit a crime are only crimes involving moral turpitude if the attempted
or aided crime also involves moral turpitude. 118 Therefore, an attempted
107. Hyder, 506 F.3d at 393.
108. Id.
109. 503 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2007).
110. Id. at 1074 (holding that "[aiccessory after the fact" is not a crime involving
moral turpitude).
111. See id. at 1080 (Tallman, J., dissenting) (discussing Itani v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d
1213 (11th Cir. 2002) and Padilla v. Gonzales, 397 F.3d 1016 (7th Cir. 2005)).
112. Id. at 1077 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
113. See, e.g., Carty v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Crimes of
moral turpitude are of basically two types, those involving fraud and those involving
grave acts of baseness or depravity."); Harms, supra note 17, at 267-70 ("divid[ing]
'crimes involving moral turpitude' into four major categories: (1) crimes against the per-
son; (2) crimes against property; (3) sex crimes and crimes involving family relation-
ships; and (4) crimes of fraud against the government or its authority.").
114. 9 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL - VISAS § 40.21(a) N2.2 (2005)
[hereinafter MANUAL], available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
86942.pdf.
115. See, e.g., Carty, 395 F.3d at 1083.
116. See MANUAL, supra note 114, § 40.21(a) N2.3.
117. See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951) ("The phrase 'crime involving
moral turpitude' has without exception been construed to embrace fraudulent con-
duct."); CIMT Annotation, supra note 41, at 503. But see Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503
F.3d 1063, 1069 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J., special concurring opinion) ("Crimes
involving fraud are not a per se category of crimes involving moral turpitude.").
118. See MANuAL, supra note 114, § 40.21(a) N2.4.
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crime or a conspiracy to commit a crime involving moral turpitude can be
considered a "crime" involving moral turpitude.
Crimes involving moral turpitude that are committed against property
typically include either the element of fraud or involve an "inherently evil
intent," such as intent to destroy." 9 Examples of these crimes include
arson, burglary, extortion, and forgery. 1 20 Crimes that do not involve
moral turpitude in this area include writing bad checks 12 1 and breaking
and entering without intent to steal.
122
Crimes committed against the government, such as counterfeiting,
perjury, and bribery, typically involve moral turpitude. 123 Yet, if a relevant
statute is regulatory in character or lacks a sufficient intent requirement,
the crime does not involve moral turpitude. 124 Examples of such crimes
include escaping from custody, 125 possession of firearms, gambling, and
drunk driving.
12 6
Crimes committed against the person, family relationship, or sexual
morality usually do not involve moral turpitude if they are minor sexual
offenses or the elements of the crime do not require malicious intent.
12 7
For example, non-reckless involuntary manslaughter 128 and simple
assault 12 9 are not crimes involving moral turpitude. Alternatively, murder,
kidnapping, rape, adultery, and abortion are crimes that involve moral
turpitude. 130
Other scholars give a list of crimes that involve moral turpitude1 3 1 or a
list of crimes that do not involve moral turpitude. 13 2 Although lists of
crimes that involve or do not involve moral turpitude are not exhaustive,
119. See id. § N2.3-1(a)-(b); see also Harms, supra note 17, at 268.
120. See MANUAL, supra note 114, § 40.21(a) N2.3-1(b). But see NORTON TOOBY WITH
KATHERINE A. BRADY, 2 CRIMINAL DEFENSE OF IMMIGRANTS 666 (3d ed. 2003) (citing Matter
of M, 2 I&N Dec. 721 (BIA 1948) to represent that burglary is not a crime of moral
turpitude).
121. Matter of Balao, 20 I&N Dec. 440, 440 (BIA 1992) (as long as intent to defraud
is not an essential element).
122. TOOBY & BRADY, supra note 120, at 666.
123. See Maryellen Fullerton & Noah Kinigstein, Strategies for Ameliorating the Immi-
gration Consequences of Criminal Convictions: A Guide for Defense Attorneys, 23 AM. CiM.
L. REv. 425, 435 (1986).
124. See id. at 435-36; see also MANUAL, supra note 114, § 40.21(a) N2.3-2(b).
125. TOOBY & BRADY, supra note 120, at 665-67.
126. MANUAL, supra note 114, § 40.21(a) N2.3-2(b)(6)(11)(12).
127. See Harms, supra note 17, at 268-69.
128. See generally Matter of Franklin, 20 I&N Dec. 867 (BIA 1994). In Franklin, the
BIA held that involuntary manslaughter in which recklessness was an element is a crime
involving moral turpitude. Id. Therefore, courts must look to the statute to see whether
a "conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk" is an element of the crime.
Markus D. Dubber, Criminalizing Complicity: A Comparative Analysis, 5 J. INT'L CRM.
JUST. 977, 992 (2007). Yet, reckless homicide is not a crime involving moral turpitude.
See TooBY & BRADY, supra note 120, at 669 (citing Matter of Szegedi, 10 I&N Dec. 28
(BIA 1962)).
129. Matter of Short, 20 I&N Dec. 136, 139 (BIA 1989).
130. See Fullerton & Kinigstein, supra note 123, at 433-34; Harnis, supra note 17, at
267 -69.
131. See, e.g., Bogdan, supra note 98, at 32.
132. TOOBY & BRADY, supra note 120, at 665-70.
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they provide insight into how courts have attacked the lack of Congres-
sional advice on this issue.
B. Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is "among the most important guaran-
tees of liberty under law."' 13 3 For over 125 years, 134 the Supreme Court
has invalidated statutes because of their "unconstitutional uncertainty.'
35
The Court has, on occasion, eloquently described the void-for-vagueness
doctrine. 136 Justice Holmes articulated one of the most famous descrip-
tions of the doctrine:
[T]he law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating
rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree.
If his judgment is wrong, not only may he incur a fine or a short imprison-
ment, . . .he may incur the penalty of death.
1 3 7
More often then not, however, the Supreme Court has declined to give
a detailed description of the doctrine.
138
A statute can be considered unconstitutionally vague for "either of two
independent reasons."'139 First, a law may be unconstitutionally vague "if
it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity
to understand what conduct [the law] prohibits.' 140 One basic purpose of
this part of the analysis is notice, which the Due Process Clause
requires. 14 1 Notice allows citizens to "steer between lawful and unlawful
conduct."'1 42 Laws should provide citizens with unambiguous definitions
133. Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
Revisited, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 279, 280 (2003) (quoting CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASON-
ING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 102 (1996)).
134. See id.
135. See Harms, supra note 17, at 270.
136. See, e.g., Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913).
137. Id. at 377. This excerpt is an oft-quoted articulation of the limits of the void-for-
vagueness policy. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 133, at 281; Benjamin D. Jackson,
Case Note, (Griffen v. Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission: An Unclear
Opinion on Vagueness, 58 ARK. L. REV. 983, 983 (2006).
138. See Goldsmith, supra note 133, at 280. One student note stated that the
Supreme Court decisions show a "habitual lack of informing reasoning." Note, The
Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 70-71 (1960).
139. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000).
140. Id. at 732.
141. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390 (1979).
142. Sarah Sparks, Case Note, Deteriorated v. Deteriorating: The Void-For-Vagueness
Doctrine and Blight Takings Norwood v. Homey, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1769, 1771 (2007).
(quoting Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)). In Grayned, the Supreme
Court specifically discussed the requirement of notice:
It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if
its prohibitions are not clearly defined.... [Blecause we assume that man is free
to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the per-
son of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohib-
ited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not
providing fair warning.
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of crimes so citizens know if their behavior is constitutionally protected. 143
A law must set out "relatively clear guidelines as to prohibited conduct and
provid[e] objective criteria to evaluate whether" someone has committed an
unlawful act.
14 4
Second, a statute is vague "if it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement."' 45 Statutes, therefore, must present
"explicit standards for those who apply them.' 46 Laws with vague lan-
guage "impermissibly delegate[ ] basic policy matters... on an ad hoc and
subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory
application."' 4 7 In 1945, Supreme CourtJustice Owen Roberts first articu-
lated the arbitrary enforcement concept in his dissenting opinion in Screws
v. United States.14 8 Although Roberts offered no precedent which sup-
ported his argument, 14 9 the Supreme Court has applied his reasoning in
many subsequent decisions. 150 In 1971, the Supreme Court in Papachris-
tou v. Jacksonville, implicitly placed the arbitrary enforcement prong on
equal footing with the lack of notice prong.
15 1
In 1983, Roberts' standard officially become part of the modern-day
test."15 2 Recently, the Court "elevated the [arbitrary enforcement] prong to
greater importance than its more senior counterpart," the notice prong.
15 3
In its discussions of the arbitrary enforcement prong, the Court has consid-
408 U.S. at 108.
143. Sparks, supra note 142, at 1771.
144. Gonzalez v. Carhart, 127 S.Ct. 1610, 1618 (2007) (internal quotations omitted).
145. Hill, 530 U.S. at 732.
146. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108.
147. Id. at 108-09.
148. 325 U.S. 91, 149 (1945) (Roberts, J., dissenting); Goldsmith, supra note 133, at
286 ("The specter of arbitrary enforcement did not appear in any Justice's vagueness
analysis until the 1945 case of Screws v. United States.").
149. Goldsmith, supra note 133, at 287.
150. See, e.g., Grayned, 408 U.S.; Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
151. 405 U.S. at 162. The Court stated that the ordinance at issue "is void for vague-
ness, both in the sense that it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice
that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute, and because it encourages
arbitrary [enforcement]." Id. (internal citations omitted).
152. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). Sometimes, the vagueness
doctrine is posed as a two-pronged test. See, e.g., Sparks, supra note 142, at 1771. Yet,
the two-pronged test and the independent reasons tests are the same; in essence, they are
contrapositives. In the "test" format, a law is considered constitutional if it passes both
prongs of the test. See id. Under the "independent reasons" formulation, the statute is
void if it does not pass either of the two reasons. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 133, at
280-81. Because the Supreme Court more recently used the latter of the two formula-
tions, this Note will refer to the test in that sense. See United States v. Williams, 128
S.Ct. 1830, 1845 (2008); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000); Chicago v.
Moralez, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999). But see Gonzalez v. Carhart, 127 S.Ct. 1610, 1628
(2007) (formulating the void-for-vagueness doctrine as a two-part test).
153. Goldsmith, supra note 133, at 289; see also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574
(1974). The Supreme Court makes this most clear in Goguen:
We recognize that in a noncommercial context behavior as a general rule is not
mapped out in advance on the basis of statutory language. In such cases, per-
haps the most meaningful aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not actual notice,
but the other principal element of the doctrine-the requirement that a legisla-
ture establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.
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ered the risks of actions not only by law enforcement personnel, but also
by prosecutors, judges, and juries.
154
Scholars have also described the vagueness doctrine as a way of main-
taining the separation of powers of the U.S. government.' 5 5 Laws that are
too vague allow the legislative branch to "abdicate their responsibilities for
setting the standards of the criminal law."'1 6 The separation of powers
rationale at one point was the second prong in the vagueness doctrine;' 5 7
however, the majority of the Court has not used it since Smith v. Goguen in
1974.158 The rationale for this transition appears to be the Court's recog-
nition that the delegation of legislative power to other branches of govern-
ment may, but will not necessarily, lead to inconsistent or arbitrary
enforcement. 15 9 Still, justices in concurring and dissenting opinions con-
tinue to cite the separation of powers rationale as a reason for vagueness
analysis. 160
II. Jordan v. De George: The Supreme Court Tiptoes Around the Void-
for-Vagueness Doctrine
In 1951, the Supreme Court made its sole proclamation on the consti-
tutionality of the term moral turpitude.1 6 1 The facts of the case are very
straightforward. Sam De George, an Italian immigrant, had lived in the
United States since 1921.162 In 1937, De George pleaded guilty to conspir-
acy to defraud the United States of taxes on distilled spirits.163 After serv-
ing his sentence, he was convicted of the same crime again in 1941.164
Both of De George's sentences were for more than one year. 165 During his
last sentence, the BIA began deportation proceedings against De George
under § 19(a) of the Immigration Act, which allows deportation of aliens
who commit multiple crimes involving moral turpitude with a term of
imprisonment of one or more years.16 6 In 1946, the BIA ordered the
deportation of De George.1
67
In response to the deportation order, De George filed a petition for
writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern
415 U.S. at 574 (internal citations omitted).
154. Goldsmith, supra note 133, at 290-91.
155. See, e.g., Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09 (noting that vague laws have the effect of
unlawfully delegating policy matter resolution to policemen, judges, and juries).
156. Sparks, supra note 142, at 1773 (quoting Goguen, 415 U.S. at 575).
157. Id.
158. Goldsmith, supra note 133, at 288; see also Goguen, 415 U.S. at 574.
159. Goldsmith, supra note 133, at 289.
160. Id. at 288 n.88.
161. CIMT Annotation, supra note 41, at 497.
162. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 224 (1951).
163. Id. at 223, 226.
164. Id. at 225.
165. Id. at 224-25. The first sentence was for a year and a day, and the second sen-
tence was for two years. Id.
166. Id. at 225 (citing Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 19(a)(1), 39 Stat. 889,
amended by 8 U.S.C. § 155(a)).
167. Id. at 225.
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District of Illinois. 168 The district court dismissed the petition,' 69 and the
Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's order. 17 0 The Seventh Circuit
started its opinion with a discussion of the "many definitions of moral tur-
pitude."' 17 1 Then, after distinguishing or discounting the three major deci-
sions from other courts of appeal,' 72 the Seventh Circuit determined that
crimes involving moral turpitude include only crimes of violence or crimes
that are commonly thought of as involving "baseness, vileness, or deprav-
ity."' 1 7 3 "Such a classification does not include the crime of evading the
payment of tax on liquor, nor of conspiring to evade that tax."'
1 74
A. Supreme Court's Majority Opinion
On November 27, 1950, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review the Seventh Circuit's decision. 17 5 At both the appellate level and at
the Supreme Court, the sole question presented was whether conspiracy to
defraud the United States of taxes on distilled spirits is a crime involving
moral turpitude.' 7 6 Chief Justice Vinson's opinion explicitly defined the
issue before the Court as a narrow inquiry "to [determine] whether this
particular offense involves moral turpitude."'17 7 Unlike the opinion of the
court of appeals, which began by looking at the definition of moral turpi-
tude, 178 the Supreme Court based its opinion predominantly on the
"unbroken course of judicial decisions" that show conspiracy to defraud
the United States of taxes on distilled spirits to involve moral turpitude. 17 9
However, despite Vinson's own declaration of the Court's limited
inquiry, the opinion of the Court went beyond the narrow issue. The
Court raised sua sponte the question of whether the moral turpitude lan-
guage was unconstitutionally vague.180 This issue was "not raised by the
parties nor argued before [the] Court."'18 1 In fact, Justice Jackson first
raised this issue in his dissent.
18 2
At the time of the Supreme Court's decision, a criminal law was
unconstitutionally vague if it failed to set an "ascertainable standard of
168. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) (No. 348).
169. Jordan, 341 U.S. at 226.
170. United States ex rel. De George v. Jordan, 183 F.2d 768, 769 (7th Cir. 1950),
rev'd 341 U.S. 223 (1951).
171. Id. at 769-70.
172. Id. at 770-71.
173. Id. at 772.
174. Id.
175. 340 U.S. 890 (1950).
176. See Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 223-24 (1951); United States ex rel. De
George, 183 F.2d at 769.
177. Jordan, 341 U.S. at 226.
178. See United States ex rel. De George, 183 F.2d at 769.
179. Jordan, 341 U.S. at 229.
180. See id. at 229.
181. Id.
182. See id. at 237-38 (Jackson,J., dissenting); see, e.g., Natasha M. Wyss, Hamdan v.
INS: The United States Fifth Circuit Demands Specificity to Validate Orders of Deportation
Based on "Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude," 71 TUL. L. REV. 1621, 1622 n.15 (1997).
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guilt."'1 8 3 According to the Court, the test was whether "the language con-
vey[ed] sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when
measured by common understanding and practices.' 8 4 The Court
expressed reluctance about applying the vagueness test because the immi-
gration statute was not a criminal law.185 However, because of the "grave
nature of deportation"'18 6 and the general "penal nature of deporta-
tion,"'18 7 the Court continued the vagueness analysis.1
88
The Court relied predominantly on three reasons for its holding.18 9
First, moral turpitude had been used for over sixty years in immigration
laws. 190 Although the Court recognized that the existence of a statute for
an extended time does not foreclose a constitutionality attack, 19 1 this argu-
ment was mitigated by the fact that the Court itself had previously con-
strued crime involving moral turpitude in United States ex rel. Volpe v.
Smith.19 2 Second, state courts have used the phrase "crime involving
moral turpitude" for various purposes outside of the immigration con-
text. 193 Finally, and most importantly, 19 4 the Court determined that
fraudulent conduct involved moral turpitude "without exception."'1 95 As
stated in the concluding paragraph:
Whatever else the phrase 'crime involving moral turpitude' may mean in
peripheral cases, the decided cases make it plain that crimes in which fraud
was an ingredient have always been regarded as involving moral turpi-
183. See Carter, supra note 22, at 960 (citing Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91
(1945)).
184. Jordan, 341 U.S. at 231-32.
185. See id. at 230.
186. See id. at 231.
187. Harms, supra note 17, at 272.
188. See Jordan, 341 U.S. at 231.
189. My determination of the three main majority arguments corresponds to the
framework identified by Justice Jackson in his dissenting opinion. Id. at 238 (Jackson,
J., dissenting). Some scholars, however, do not analyze the majority's argument in the
same fashion. One scholar combined the first two quoted reasons and maintained that
the void-for-vagueness doctrine only applied to criminal laws. See Carter, supra note 22,
at 960. Because the immigration laws are not criminal, this doctrine was inapplicable.
See id. This is an incorrect interpretation of the majority opinion. Although the majority
expressed reluctance in applying the vagueness analysis, the Court still applied the anal-
ysis because of the penal nature and severe consequences of deportation. See Jordan,
341 U.S. at 230-32. If a criminal statute cannot be considered void for vagueness, why
would the Court have even bothered continuing to analyze the question of vagueness?
190. See Jordan, 341 U.S. at 229-30.
191. See id. at 229 n.14.
192. See id. at 230 (citing United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422 (1933)).
193. See id. at 238.
194. Although the Court never states that the fraudulent conduct reason is most
important, this seems to be an accurate conclusion since the concluding paragraph of
the majority opinion dwells on this concept the most. See id. at 232; Corp. of Haverford
Coll. v. Reeher, 329 F. Supp. 1196, 1205 (E.D. Pa. 1971) ("[T]he majority in Jordan
seems to have considered the determinative issue to be whether 'crime involving moral
turpitude' was unconstitutionally uncertain in reference to a particular conviction.")
(emphasis added). But see Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 131 (1967) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting) (implying that moral turpitude having "deep roots in the law" was the determi-
native issue).
195. See Jordan, 341 U.S. at 232.
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tude.... Fraud is the touchstone by which this case should be judged....
We therefore decide that Congress sufficiently forewarned respondent that
the statutory consequence of twice conspiring to defraud the United States
is deportation.
196
B. Justice Jackson's Dissent
Justices Jackson, Black, and Frankfurter dissented in Jordan with Jus-
tice Jackson authoring the dissenting opinion. 19 7 Unlike the majority
opinion, Justice Jackson began with an analysis of moral turpitude, includ-
ing a quick recognition that no basic definition of this term exists. 198 He
explained that Congress was aware of the confusion over the phrase and
purposely left interpretation of the phrase up to the courts and administra-
tive bodies. 1 99 According to Jackson, the typical tools that courts use to
define moral turpitude-the seriousness of the crime, the common-law dis-
tinction between crimes mala prohibita and mala in se, the standards that
the Government and Respondent proposed, 200 and even dictionaries-were
unable to provide an unambiguous meaning.
20 1
Justice Jackson next responded to the majority's three main argu-
ments. He first explained that the majority was incorrect in stating that
moral turpitude has been an element of immigration laws for sixty
years. 20 2 Jackson discussed how the Act of 1891 allowed deportation for a
conviction of any felony or crime with a sentence of a year or longer and
for "misdemeanors involving moral turpitude. '20 3 It was not until the Act
of 1917 that all crimes needed to involve moral turpitude for deportation
to occur. 20 4 Moreover, the majority's reliance on United States ex rel. Volpe
v. Smith was also inaccurate, because in Volpe the Court neither analyzed
nor discussed the vagueness of moral turpitude.20 5 Furthermore, Jackson
analyzed a group of lower court cases to show how "unguiding" and "cap-
ric[ious]" they had been in enforcing the Act of 1917.206
Next, Jackson quickly rebutted the majority's idea that state courts'
use of moral turpitude could be useful to the federal courts. He reasoned
that the federal government does not allow for common law crimes, and
state courts have been just as unsuccessful as federal courts in articulating
196. See id.
197. See id. at 232 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
198. See id. at 233.
199. See id.
200. The Government's proposed definition was that moral turpitude should be
based on "the moral standards that prevail in contemporary society." See Carter, supra
note 22, at 961 (quoting Jordan, 341 U.S. at 236-37 (Jackson, J., dissenting)). The
Respondent proposed that the standard be only crimes of violence. See Jordan, 341 U.S.
at 235.
201. See Jordan, 341 U.S. at 234-38.
202. See id. at 238.
203. Id. at 230 n.12.
204. See id. at 238 n.12; see also Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 19(a)(1), 39 Stat.
889, amended by 8 U.S.C. § 155(a).
205. See generally United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422 (1933).
206. Jordan, 341 U.S. at 239-40, 239 n.13.
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a clear definition of moral turpitude. 20 7
Finally, the dissent looked more specifically at the crime at issue-the
nonpayment of a tax-and used legal common sense in questioning
whether the "disregard of the Nation's liquor taxes ... should banish an
alien from [society.]" 20 8 Jackson further stated that the constitutionality of
the standard "moral turpitude" cannot be reconciled with previous
Supreme Court decisions declaring other statutes vague. 20 9 The statutes
in those cases were "certainly no more vague than the one before [the
Court] now and had not caused even a fraction of the judicial conflict that
'moral turpitude' has."2 10 In conclusion, Jackson acknowledged that the
Court should be very hesitant to declare a statute unconstitutionally vague,
but in Jordan it was necessary to do So.
2 1 1
C. Interpretation of Jordan
The exact reach of the Supreme Court's holding in Jordan is specula-
tive. At first, most courts and scholars interpreted Jordan as barring any
vagueness challenges to the term moral turpitude.2 12 Courts did little
more than cite or quote the Jordan opinion for this proposition. The Sev-
enth Circuit in United States ex rel. Circella v. Sahli2 13 devoted less than a
paragraph to the void-for-vagueness "discussion. '2 14 In Tseung Chu v. Cor-
nell,2 15 the Ninth Circuit quoted verbatim seven paragraphs of the Jordan
decision and then added the conclusion that "while it is true that Mr. Jus-
tice Jackson ... wrote a strong dissent, we feel bound by the language and
reasoning of the majority." 2 16 Scholars agreed, with one commentator call-
ing Jackson's dissent one of his "boldest attempt[s]" to mitigate the danger
of vague laws.
2 1 7
With the passing of time, courts and scholars began to give further
207. See id. at 240.
208. See id. at 241.
209. See id. at 243-44.
210. See id. at 244.
211. See id. at 245.
212. See Harms, supra note 17, at 272.
213. 216 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1954).
214. The Court's discussion on the vagueness issue was as follows:
[Respondent's] final contention is that the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952 is unconstitutional. He contends that this Act as well as the 1917 Act is
unconstitutional because the use of the phrase "involving moral turpitude" to
describe the type of crimes the commission of which is to make an alien subject
to deportation makes the law "void for vagueness." The Supreme Court decided
this question .... in Jordan v. De George .... The Court there said that the
descriptive phrase, "involving moral turpitude," conveys "sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understand-
ing and practices."
Id. at 40 (internal citations omitted). The Seventh Circuit made no attempt to interpret
Jordan beyond this one quotation. See generally id.
215. 247 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1957).
216. Id. at 938-39.
217. Louis L. Jaffe, Mr. Justice Jackson, 68 -LAv. L. REV. 940, 983-84 (1955). Jaffe's
dismissal of Jackson's dissent is evident where he uses the rare exclamation point to
express his view: "The standard, Uackson] insisted with considerable force, wit, and
2008 "Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude"
credence to Justice Jackson's dissent 2 18 and started to interpret the Jordan
holding as narrower than originally understood. 2
19 In Ramirez v. INS,2 20
the D.C. Court of Appeals claimed that Jordan foreclosed a vagueness argu-
ment, but stated that the "Supreme Court [was] the proper forum for pres-
entation" of this question. 22 1 Two years later, the District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania recognized that the holding of Jordan was
limited to fraudulent crimes. 22 2 The court held that a state statute
allowing the denial of financial aid to students convicted of a "misde-
meanor involving moral turpitude" was unconstitutionally vague.
2 23
Although the decision could have triggered other courts to reconsider this
issue, 22 4 no courts have done so thus far.
22 5
Some courts of appeal and prominent justices still question the useful-
ness of the term moral turpitude. In 2004, Judge Posner, in a Seventh Cir-
cuit decision, declared in dicta that "[t]he term may well have outlived its
usefulness," but that this question was "not for [the circuit court] to
decide."'2 26 Moreover, Judge Posner implied the vagueness of the term by
stating that "[tjime has only confirmed Justice Jackson's powerful dissent
in the De George case, in which he called 'moral turpitude' an 'undefined
and undefinable standard.' 2 27 Multiple courts, including the Ninth Cir-
cuit, have quoted Posner's language in subsequent opinions with
approval. 228 Scholars are divided as to the reach of the Jordan decision.
22 9
ingenuity, was too vague for judicial administration, this despite the fact that the courts
had been administering it for sixty years!" Id. at 984 (emphasis added).
218. See, e.g., Heifetz, supra note 11 (discussing Jackson's "poignant dissent").
219. See, e.g., CIMT Annotation, supra note 41, at 499 ("[T]he Jordan decision ... is
quite clearly limited to holding that the phrase 'crime involving moral turpitude' is not
unconstitutionally vague where the crime was one of fraud.").
220. 413 F.2d 405 (1969).
221. Id. at 406.
222. Corp. of Haverford Coll. v. Reeher, 329 F. Supp. 1196, 1205 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
223. Id. at 1206.
224. See CIMT Annotation, supra note 41, at 499.
225. See Harms, supra note 17, at 271-72 (stating that "one court"-the Haverford
court-has said that Jordan was not definitive on the vagueness question).
226. Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737, 741 (7th Cir. 2004).
227. Id. (quoting Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 235 (1951) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting)).
228. Galeana-Mendoza v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 1054, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006); Zaranska v.
DHS, 400 F. Supp.2d 500, 514 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). In fact, the Ninth Circuit was so
taken by this language that it began its Galeana-Mendoza decision by quoting Judge
Posner. See 465 F.3d at 1055.
229. Compare Carter, supra note 22, at 962 (the void-for-vagueness argument is
closed), Gregory E. Fehlings, Deportation as a Consequence of a Court-Martial Conviction,
7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 295, 314 n.149 (1993) (moral turpitude is not vague), Harms, supra
note 17, at 270 (noting that Jordan held that moral turpitude is not vague), and Robert
Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some of the Constitution's
Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 305, 318 n.61 (2000)
(moral turpitude is not vague), with CIMT Annotation, supra note 41, at 499, and Nancy
Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 97, 130 (1998) ("The Court proceeded to rule that as to the particular issue
presented to the Court-whether the statute was vague as applied to a conviction for
fraud-there was no vagueness problem.").
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This Note argues that the Jordan holding should be interpreted narrowly
and that therefore, the broader constitutional question remains open.
III. Jordan Does Not Block a Vagueness Attack
A. Preliminary Issues
"The void-for-vagueness doctrine is itself vague," because it does not
explicitly state when a statute is too vague to be constitutional. 230 Still, the
reluctance expressed by some commentators to apply the void-for-vague-
ness doctrine to civil statutes is misguided. 23 1 The void-for-vagueness doc-
trine applies to both criminal and civil statutes. 2 32 In fact, the Supreme
Court has declared civil statutes vague without discussing the distinction
between civil and criminal statutes.
23 3
The policy reasons for applying the same standards to civil and crimi-
nal statutes, especially immigration and deportation statutes which are
penal in nature, are apparent. The consequences of committing a crime of
moral turpitude are extremely severe. 23 4 The punishment is imposed in
the same fashion and is as severe as a criminal sentence. 235 For these rea-
sons, this Note will treat the removal statutes as though they were criminal
statutes for the purpose of the void-for-vagueness doctrine.
230. Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody Speech Restrictions, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 657 (2006).
231. See, e.g., Stephen R. Baird, Moral Intervention in the Trademark Arena: Banning the
Registration of Scandalous and Immoral Trademarks, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 661, 664-65
(1993); Robert H. Wright, Today's Scandal Can Be Tomorrow's Vogue: Why Section 2(A) of
the Lanham Act is Unconstitutionally Void For Vagueness, 48 How. LJ. 659, 682-83
(2005).
232. See Volokh, supra note 230, at 657 n.116 (citing Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501
U.S. 1030, 1048-51 (1991)); see also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 159-64 (1974)
(plurality); Id. at 164 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in result in part)
(agreeing with plurality that the void-for-vagueness test is applicable to both criminal
and civil statutes); Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,
576-79 (1973); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1967); Cohen v. San
Bernardino Valley Coll., 92 F.3d 968, 970 (9th Cir. 1996); Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ.,
55 F.3d 1177, 1183-84 (6th Cir. 1995); Silva v. Univ. of N.H., 888 F. Supp. 293, 312-13
(D.N.H. 1994); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 867 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
233. See Keyishian, 385 U.S.; Corp. of Haverford Coll. v. Reeher, 329 F. Supp. 1196,
1203 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (discussing Keyishian). Previously, the Supreme Court made it
clear that the civil-criminal distinction is very important in the void-for-vagueness
inquiry. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948). In Jordan, 341 U.S. 223, the
court cited the dissent in Winters, which begs the question of whether Winters is still
good law. Id. at 230, 244 n.19 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Granted, the Court has made
clear that aliens who are faced with the possibility of deportation do not receive "various
protections that apply in the context of a criminal trial." INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468
U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984). But in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, the Court proceeded to list the
"various protections" and the void-for-vagueness doctrine was not mentioned. Id. at
1038-39.
234. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
235. Carter, supra note 22, at 962 n.41 (discussing justice Jackson's dissenting opin-
ion in Jordan).
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B. Concerns with the Jordan Decision
There are three main criticisms or interpretational problems with the
Jordan opinion which suggest that Jordan does not foreclose the void-for-
vagueness attack on moral turpitude. First, the holding in the case is
extremely narrow and only pertains to a specific type of crime.2 36 This
criticism is the main reason that the broader constitutional issue is not
foreclosed today. The second and third concerns-the sua sponte prob-
lem 23 7 and other flaws in the majority opinion, 238 respectively-are rea-
sons to give less deference to the decision.
1. Narrow Holding Binding Only "Easy" Fraud Cases
Despite the conflict over the breadth of the Jordan holding,23 9 the deci-
sion is "quite clearly limited to holding that the phrase 'crime involving
moral turpitude' is not constitutionally vague where the crime was one of
fraud."2 40 The last paragraph of the Jordan opinion, where the court actu-
ally gives its holding, makes this point unambiguous:
We conclude that [the test as to whether the language conveys sufficiently
definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practices] has been satisfied here. Whatever else the
phrase 'crime involving moral turpitude' may mean in peripheral cases, the
decided cases make it plain that crimes in which fraud was an ingredient
have always been regarded as involving moral turpitude. We have recently
stated that doubt as to the adequacy of a standard in less obvious cases does
not render that standard unconstitutional for vagueness. But there is no
such doubt present in this case. Fraud is the touchstone by which this case
should be judged. The phrase 'crime involving moral turpitude' has without
exception been construed to embrace fraudulent conduct. We therefore
decide that Congress sufficiently forewarned respondent that the statutory
consequence of twice conspiring to defraud the United States is
deportation.
24 1
There are two important points in this paragraph. First, looking at the
first three sentences, the void-for-vagueness test was fulfilled only for fraud
cases. The Court only discussed the test for "peripheral cases," and
expressed an obvious reluctance. Second, we see that the holding of Jordan
is limited solely to fraudulent conduct. In the last three sentences of the
opinion, arguably the most important portion, the court performs a
straightforward analysis; because fraud is the outcome-determinative rea-
son in this case 24 2 and fraud always involves moral turpitude, 24 3 the Court
236. See infra Part l1I.B.1.
237. See infra Part 11l.B.2.
238. See infra Part II.B.3.
239. See supra Part II.C.
240. CIMT Annotation, supra note 41, at 503.
241. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1951) (internal citations omitted;
emphasis added).
242. See id. ("Fraud is the touchstone by which this case should be judged.").
243. See id. ("The phrase 'crime involving moral turpitude' has without exception
been construed to embrace fraudulent conduct.").
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concludes that defrauding the United States government involves moral
turpitude.
244
Courts have repeatedly misinterpreted the Jordan opinion. The Ninth
Circuit in a subsequent case conveniently left out most of the last para-
graph of the Jordan opinion despite quoting almost an entire page of its
analysis. 24 5 Another appellate court summarized Jordan by quoting the
void-for-vagueness standard and giving almost no explanation of how it
was fulfilled.2 46 Some courts have used nonbinding precedent to avoid the
void-for-vagueness argument.
24 7
Jordan, the Supreme Court's only proclamation on this issue,
248
should be narrowly construed to cases involving fraudulent conduct. The
literal language of the holding in the concluding paragraph of the opinion
demonstrates that the broader constitutional issue is still open.
249
2. Void-for-Vagueness Argument Raised Sua Sponte
The Supreme Court has never received a brief or heard oral argument
on the question of whether moral turpitude is unconstitutionally vague.
250
Although the Court is allowed to raise issues sua sponte, the dangers of
doing this have been expressed both by Supreme Court Justices 25 I and
244. See id. ("We therefore decide that Congress sufficiently forewarned respondent
that the statutory consequence of twice conspiring to defraud the United States is
deportation.").
245. Tseung Chu v. Cornell, 247 F.2d 929, 938-39 (9th Cir. 1957).
246. United States ex rel. Circella v. Sahli, 216 F.2d 33, 40 (7th Cir. 1954). The
Seventh Circuit claimed that the Supreme Court held "that the descriptive phrase
'involving moral turpitude,' conveyled] 'sufficiently definite warning as to the pro-
scribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices."' Id. How-
ever, this is taken out of context of the opinion. The Supreme Court's actual wording
was as follows:
The test is whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.
We conclude that the test is satisfied here. Whatever else the phrase "crime
involving moral turpitude" may mean in peripheral cases, the decided cases
make it plain that crimes in which fraud was an ingredient have always been
regarded as involving moral turpitude .... Fraud is the touchstone by which this
case should be judged.
Jordan, 341 U.S. at 231-32 (emphasis added). Therefore, the Seventh Circuit was
mistaken.
247. See Marciano v. INS, 450 F.2d 1022, 1024 (8th Cir. 1971) (citing Ramirez v. INS,
413 F.2d 405 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).
248. See CIMT Annotation, supra note 41, at 497.
249. See supra notes 236-241 and accompanying text.
250. See Jordan, 341 U.S. at 229 ("The question of vagueness was not raised by the
parties nor argued before this Court."); CIMT Annotation, supra note 41, at 499 (stating
Jordan is the Supreme Court's only decision on the vagueness of moral turpitude). But
see United States ex rel. Ulrich v. Kellogg, 30 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1929) (upholding the
constitutionality of an exclusion statute, albeit with less than a paragraph of discussion).
251. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 572 (1993)
(Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("Sound judicial deci-
sionmaking requires [that] .. .a constitutional rule announced sua sponte is entitled to
less deference than one addressed on full briefing and argument."); Monell v. Dep't of
Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 709 n.6 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) ("I think we owe
somewhat less deference to a decision that was rendered without benefit of a full airing
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scholars. 25 2 Raising and deciding issues sua sponte, as in Jordan is espe-
cially problematic because it denies the parties the opportunity to be
heard.2 53 These decisions are contrary to the adversarial system as they
counteract the "active parties and an inactive court" policy that is wide-
spread in the law.
25 4
A recent article written by Professor Adam A. Milani and Professor
Michael R. Smith, which details the evils of sua sponte decisions, sets forth
three recommendations that can clarify this issue.25 5 First, once the court
members identify an issue which was not previously raised, appellate
courts should request supplemental briefs and arguments from counsel. 25 6
The Jordan court did not request supplemental briefs.2 57 Second, appellate
courts making sua sponte decisions should grant the losing party's request
for rehearing as a matter of right. 25 8 The Supreme Court denied the
request for a rehearing after oral arguments inJordan.25 9 Finally, similar to
dicta, sua sponte decisions do not fully consider the issue and therefore,
should be given less deference.
2 60
3. Flaws of the Majority Opinion
The majority opinion's premise and analysis appear to rest on flawed
or incorrect grounds. Some of these grounds can be found in Justice Jack-
son's dissent; others are simple observations by the author of this Note.
First, the Court's argument that the "deep roots"2 6 1 of moral turpitude
had given it settled meaning rested on multiple flawed premises. For exam-
ple, it was misleading for the Court to claim that it had previously con-
strued moral turpitude in Smith.26 2 The Court's only "discussion" of
moral turpitude in that case was its proclamation that counterfeiting is
"plainly a crime involving moral turpitude. ' '26 3 The Court's suggestion
that constitutionality is proven by the appearance of moral turpitude in the
statute at issue for over sixty years and in a variety of other settings is also
of no value. Although the longevity of a statute may be evidence of the
validity of a statute, this is only true when "the passing years have by
of all the relevant considerations."); Sixty-Seventh Minn. State Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S.
187, 203 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
252. See, e.g., Note, Appellate-Court Sua Sponte Activity: Remaking Disputes and the
Rule of Non-Intervention, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 352 (1966) [hereinafter Sua Sponte Note].
253. See, e.g., Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look at Sua
Sponte Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 TENN. L. REV. 245, 251 (2002) (arguing that
issues may be raised, but should not be decided sua sponte); Allan D. Vestal, Sua Sponte
Consideration in Appellate Review, 27 FORDHAM L. REV. 477, 493 (1959).
254. See Sua Sponte Note, supra note 252, at 353.
255. See Milani & Smith, supra note 253, at 294-315.
256. Id. at 294.
257. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
258. See Milani & Smith, supra note 253, at 304.
259. 341 U.S. 956 (1951) (denial of rehearing).
260. See Milani & Smith, supra note 253, at 307.
261. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 227 (1951).
262. Id. at 239 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
263. See Carter, supra note 22, at 961 n.37 (citing United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith,
289 U.S. 422, 423 (1933)).
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administration practice or judicial construction served to make it clear as a
word of legal art."'26 4 Courts are still bewildered by the vague term "moral
turpitude" over fifty years after the Jordan decision.
265
Also, the Court did not appear to have completely considered the con-
stitutional issue of vagueness. 26 6 At the time Jordan was decided, a law was
"unconstitutionally vague if it failed to set an 'ascertainable standard of
guilt."267 However, the majority opinion never uses the phrase "ascertain-
able standard of guilt" or the word "notice" in its void-for-vagueness discus-
sion.268 One wonders if the Court actually fully considered the issue of
constitutionality, or instead, "disposed" of the issue.
Also, one can easily argue that because the broader constitutional
question was not included in the petition for certiorari the Court was pre-
cluded from considering it.2 69 Supreme Court Rule 14.1(a) states that
"[olnly the questions set out in the petition, or fairly included therein, will
be considered by the Court."2 70 Questions that are complementary and
not subsidiary to the question presented to the Court are not "fairly
included therein."2 71 In Jordan, the sole question presented was "whether
conspiracy to defraud the United States of taxes on distilled spirits is a
'crime involving moral turpitude."' 27 2 The vagueness of the statute regard-
ing fraudulent crimes was arguably a subsidiary question, so the Court
could, and did, consider that question.2 73 However, the question of
whether the entire statute is void for vagueness was not part of the certio-
rari petition and thus was not considered a subsidiary question.2 74 This is
264. Jordan, 341 U.S. at 238-39 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
265. See, e.g., discussion infra Part IV. Despite over 110 years of statutory presence,
the Ninth Circuit's fragmented decision in Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063
(9th Cir. 2007), is a simple demonstration of the this bewilderment.
266. But see Ramirez v. INS, 413 F.2d 405, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("Upon full consider-
ation of the question the [Jordan] Court upheld the statute as constitutional.").
267. Carter, supra note 22, at 960 (quoting Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 95
(1945)).
268. See Jordan, 341 U.S. at 229-32. The Court does use the word "notice" when it
introduces the purpose of the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine, id. at 230, but does not use
the word in the actual discussion, meaning when it articulates a "test" or during the
application of the law. See id. at 229-32.
269. No commentators appear to have made this argument regarding the Jordan deci-
sion; however, Supreme Court Justices have discussed this rule. See, e.g., Lebron v. Nat'l
R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 400-01 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the broad constitutional challenge should not have been considered because it was
not presented in the petition for certiorari).
270. SuP. CT. R. 14.1(a).
271. Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 537-38 (1992) (following Rule 14.1(a) in con-
sidering only the question raised and refusing to consider the regulatory taking question
because it was "related to the one petitioners presented, and perhaps complementary" to
it, but was not subsidiary to it).
272. Jordan, 341 U.S. at 223-24.
273. Id. at 227-28 (stating that courts have held that a crime in which fraud is an
ingredient involves moral turpitude and concluding that the vagueness doctrine's stan-
dards of specificity had been satisfied in the case because the crime charged was "con-
spiracy to defraud").
274. Id. at 229 (noting that the question of vagueness was not raised by the parties
nor argued before the Court).
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yet another reason why the Jordan holding is narrow and its decision
should be accorded less deference.
Thus, the void-for-vagueness argument should be available today. The
narrow holding in Jordan and the many flaws of the opinion keep this ave-
nue open.
IV. "Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude" is Unconstitutionally Vague
A statute can be void for vagueness for either of two independent rea-
sons.27 5 The immigration statutes at issue could be found unconstitu-
tional under both prongs.
Moral turpitude "fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a rea-
sonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits. ' 276 In Jor-
dan, the Court stated that "doubt as to the adequacy of a standard in less
obvious cases does not render the standard unconstitutional for vague-
ness."2 77 However, it is not the "less obvious cases" that "remain under the
shadows of constitutional doubt and lack of forewarning, but the entire
body of moral turpitude law that happens to lie outside the fraud con-
text."2 78 Courts are only comfortable when "tread[ing] ... the familiar
territory of well-cultivated precedent." 279 Beyond this narrow context, the
number of splits among courts of appeal and ambiguities of the term are
rampant.
280
Even the so-called "well-cultivated precedent" has been called into
doubt. The resident alien in Jordan may have had sufficient forewarning of
the consequences of his actions because fraudulent crimes were without
exception crimes involving moral turpitude.2 8 1 However, the Ninth Cir-
cuit, in a recent, extremely fractured en banc decision, addressed the fraud-
ulent crimes discussion again and created additional conflict.28 2 Of the
275.' Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000).
276. Id.
277. Jordan, 341 U.S. at 232. In American Communications Association v. Douds, 339
U.S. 382, 412 (1950), the Court emphasized a similar point by stating, "[t]here is little
doubt that imagination can conjure hypothetical cases in which the meaning of these
terms will be in nice question."
278. Heifetz, supra note 11, at 1293-94; see also Franklin v. INS, 72 F.3d 571, 595
(8th Cir. 1995) (Bennett, J., dissenting) (defining the case as "one of those uncomforta-
ble 'peripheral' or 'less obvious' cases" where the application of the void-for-vagueness
standard is uncertain).
279. See Franklin, 72 F.3d at 595 (Bennett, J., dissenting).
280. Compare Hyder v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 388, 393 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that the
misuse of a Social Security Number is a crime involving moral turpitude), with Beltran-
Tirado v. INS, 213 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the misuse of a Social Secur-
ity Number is not a crime involving moral turpitude).
281. Heifetz, supra note 11, at 1293-94. However, even this assertion can be called
into question because the Supreme Court granted certiorari for the purpose of resolving
a circuit split. Jordan, 341 U.S. at 226 ("We granted certiorari to review the decision ...
as conflicting with decisions of the court of appeals in other circuits.").
282. Compare Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1069 (9th Cir. 2007) (stat-
ing that crimes involving fraud are not a per se category of crimes involving moral turpi-
tude), with Itani v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that
misprision of a felony is a crime of moral turpitude), and Padilla v. Gonzales, 397 F.3d
Cornell International Law Journal
fifteen justices hearing the case,28 3 nine justices thought that accessory
after the fact was not a crime involving moral turpitude 28 4 and six thought
that it did involve moral turpitude.28 5 Four different opinions were written
about whether this crime involved fraud and how fraud should be ana-
lyzed.28 6 Judge Harry Pregerson, the author of the majority opinion, in a
special concurring opinion with which the rest of the majority disagreed,
even stated that "crimes involving fraud [were] not a per se category of
crimes involving moral turpitude. '28 7 When fifteen justices arrive at four
distinct conclusions, one wonders where to look for an "unambiguous defi-
nition" that can let U.S. citizens know if they have engaged in illegal
conduct.
2 8 8
The term also authorizes or encourages arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. When trying to prevent discriminatory enforcement, "the
question is not whether discriminatory enforcement occurred [in a specific
factual situation], but whether the Rule is so imprecise that discriminatory
enforcement is a real possibility. '28 9 The fact that Congress originally
relied on judges to define the term "crimes involving moral turpitude"
already implies unpredictability and arbitrariness.
290
The lack of adequate standards can be seen in some recent decisions
at the federal appellate level. For example, in a Ninth Circuit opinion, a
three-judge panel found that engaging in intercourse with a minor who is
under sixteen years of age when the perpetrator is twenty-one years of age
or older, known as statutory rape, is not a crime that categorically involves
1016, 1020 (7th Cir. 2005) (expanding the meaning of fraud to include "concealing
criminal behavior" and holding that because obstruction of justice entails an intent to
conceal criminal activity, it involves moral turpitude).
283. Navarro-Lopez, 503 F.3d at 1065.
284. See id. at 1065, 1074 (listing the names of the author of the majority opinion and
the author and joiners of a concurring opinion which garnered a majority of the
justices).
285. See id. at 1078 (Tallman, J., dissenting, joined by O'Scannlain, J., Rawlinson, J.,
Clifton, J., Bybee, J.); id. at 1084 (Bea, J., dissenting, joined by O'Scannlain, J.).
286. Both the majority and concurring opinions apply the categorical and modified
categorical approaches. See id. at 1067 (majority opinion); id. at 1074 (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring) (agreeeing with the general approach and holding of the majority opinion).
However, in a special concurrence by Justice Pregerson, he said that crimes involving
fraud should be analyzed under the same standard as other crimes. Id. at 1068-69.
The rest of the majority disagreed with Judge Pregerson and argued that crimes involv-
ing fraud should be analyzed under a special standard. See id. at 1075-76 (Reinhardt,
J., concurring). Justice Tallman's opinion, the first of two dissents, claimed that acces-
sory after the fact involves fraud and that he would use the Ninth Circuit precedent in
Goldeshtein v. INS, 8 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 1993), to hold that this crime involves moral
turpitude. Navarro-Lopez, 503 F.3d at 1078-84 (Tallman, J., dissenting). Justice Bea,
who wrote the second dissent, would not use the categorical approach, but instead
would "look to the manner in which the term 'moral turpitude' has been applied by
judicial decision," to determine if this crime involves moral turpitude. Id. at 1085-86
(Bea, J., dissenting) (quoting Jordan, 341 U.S. at 227).
287. Navarro-Lopez, 503 F.3d at 1069.
288. For statutory interpretation and the vagueness doctrine, see Sparks, supra note
142, at 1771.
289. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1051 (1991).
290. See Harms, supra note 17, at 273.
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moral turpitude. 29 1 The holding basically rested on the proposition that it
would be feasible for statutory rape to occur between two people who met
in high school and continued a relationship. 29 2 In other words, because
such a factual scenario has the slightest chance of occurring, statutory rape
does not categorically involve moral turpitude. 29 3 Courts and the BIA have
argued that this rule is supported by the literal text of the immigration
statutes and for other policy reasons. 294 Even if this is the case, how could
this argument-allowing justices to search for factual scenarios unrelated
to the facts at hand to come to a conclusion about whether a statute
involves moral turpitude-represent adequate guidelines for the term moral
turpitude?
The Supreme Court has recognized "eight ways to defend statutes
against vagueness allegations." 2 95 None of these defenses could feasibly
be argued for the immigration statutes here. These eight defenses are: (1)
judicial interpretation adequately narrows the statute, (2) legislative his-
tory illuminates the meaning, (3) specialized definitions illuminate the
meaning, (4) common understanding of language illuminates the meaning,
(5) context of prohibited conduct illuminates the meaning, (6) law enforce-
ment agencies have given the statute adequate meaning, (7) the statute
requires scienter, and (8) the statute is easy to apply in practice.
29 6
Foremost, federal appellate courts have been unable to provide a nar-
rowing construction of the immigration statutes. Fair warning should be
"whether the ordinary and ordinarily law-abiding individual would have
received some signal that his or her conduct risked violation of the ...
law."'29 7 Statutes must use words with "well-defined and universally
accepted meanings. ' 2 98 The term moral turpitude has never been well-
defined and has never had a single accepted definition. 29 9 The defense of a
narrowing construction should therefore be unavailable.
Legislative history, specialized definitions, common understanding of
language, context of prohibited conduct, and law enforcement agencies
have all been unable to illuminate the meaning of the term moral turpitude.
In fact, the legislative history only demonstrates the vagueness of the stat-
291. Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 688, 691 (9th Cir. 2007).
292. Id. at 693 ("[Almong the range of conduct criminalized by [the statute] would be
consensual intercourse between a 21-year-old (possibly a college sophomore) and a
minor who is 15 years, 11 months (possibly a high school junior). That relationship
may very well have begun when the older of the two was a high school senior and the
younger a high school freshman and have continued monogamously without intercourse
for two to three years before the offending event.").
293. See id.
294. See Carter, supra note 22, at 965.
295. Goldsmith, supra note 133, at 294.
296. See id. at 295-303.
297. Id. at 296 (quotingJohn Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construc-
tion of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REx.. 189, 211 (1985))-
298. Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 67
(1983).
299. See, e.g., supra Part I.A.1.
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ute.30 0 The Police Commissioner of New York City was very influential in
his congressional testimony before the enactment of the Act of 1917.301
His testimony strongly supports the idea that Congress had in mind only
crimes of violence as crimes involving moral turpitude, 30 2 but this inter-
pretation has never been adopted.
The deportation and exclusionary statutes are also not easy to practi-
cally apply. In United States v. Ragen,30 3 the Supreme Court upheld a stat-
ute prohibiting willful tax evasion because the statute had been in
existence for years without "any apparent general confusion bespeaking
inadequate statutory guidance."'30 4 The United States immigration stat-
utes, while having been on the books for approximately one hundred years,
do not fall into this category. The statutes do not contain a scienter
requirement, as it is not necessary for an alien to knowingly or purposely
commit a crime.30 5 In fact, one scholar has proposed that requiring




Even a terse analysis of the immigration statutes regarding crimes
involving moral turpitude reveals a problem with interpretation. "Moral
turpitude" is an unconstitutionally vague term and Jordan v. De George
does not foreclose such an argument. Congress knowingly conceived the
term in confusion; and this confusion has never settled.30 7 If the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security had crafted a clear definition of moral turpi-
tude, it should receive deference, but the DHS never has.
300. See, e.g., Cabral v. INS, 15 F.3d 193, 195 (1st Cit. 1994) ("The legislative history
leaves no doubt . . . that Congress left the term 'crime involving moral turpitude' to
future administrative and judicial interpretation.").
301. See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 235 & n.8 (1951) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
302. Id. at 235 n.8. The Police Commissioner's testimony explicitly asked for provi-
sions to allow for the deportation of violent aliens:
I would make provisions to get rid of an alien in this country who comes here
and commits felonies and burglaries, holds you up on the streets, and commits
crimes against our daughters, because we do not want that kind of alien here,
and they have no right to be here .... The rule is that if we get a man in this
country who has not become a citizen, who knocks down people in the street,
who murders or who attempts to murder people, who burglarizes our houses
with blackjack and revolver, who attacks our women in the city, those people
should not be here.
Id. (quoting Hearing on H.R. 10384 Before the H. Comm. on Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion, 64th Cong., 14 (1916)).
303. 314 U.S. 513 (1942).
304. Goldsmith, supra note 133, at 303 (quoting Ragen, 314 U.S. at 524).
305. See Heifetz, supra note 11, at 1286 (arguing that "a crime whose statutory defini-
tion does not require purpose or knowledge should never constitute a crime involving
moral turpitude").
306. Id. at 1294 (arguing that it is imperative that purpose or knowledge be requisite
elements of any offense subject to the categorization of moral turpitude).
307. See supra notes 8-19, 28-30 and accompanying text.
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Resident aliens, like all United States citizens, are entitled to due pro-
cess of law.30 8 If Congress had decided upon an expansive list of deport-
able and exclusionary crimes, the void-for-vagueness problem would not be
an issue.30 9 Instead, Congress knowingly conceived of a vague and nebu-
lous term which gives no one-resident aliens, lawyers, and judges alike-a
definition or even an adequate roadmap to follow. 3 10 The term "crimes
involving moral turpitude" is "notoriously plastic ... [and] so ambulatory
that some Justices have thought it unconstitutionally vague."'3 11 Over fifty
years ago, the Supreme Court in Jordan was unclear in its holding; the next
time it must be more specific and declare the statute void for vagueness.
308. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 679 (2001) ("[T]he Due Process Clause applies
to all persons within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence is law-
ful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent."); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954)
(stating that "an alien [who legally became part of the American community] has the
same protection for his life, liberty, and property under the Due Process Clause as is
afforded to a citizen"); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 243 (1951) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
309. See Franklin v. INS, 72 F.3d 571 (8th Cir. 1995).
310. See Marmolejo-Campos v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2007).
311. Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 2008).

